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UNDERVALUING INDETERMINACY: TRANSLATING
SOCIAL SCIENCE INTO LAW
Elizabeth Mertz*
INTRODUCTION
Among the biggest challenges facing attempts to translate between
social science and law is the problem of indeterminacy. Social scien-
tists and legal scholars alike certainly accept the idea that both social
science and law can be indeterminate. Indeed, as others in this Sym-
posium note, a stark division between uncertainty and predictability
tends to oversimplify the situation.' Both in law and in social science,
it may be better to ask where and how demands for certainty arise-
or to what degree and when indeterminacy is acceptable and even
welcome. However, scholars from law and social science approach
the issue with very different frameworks. This can lead to inaccurate
or distorted interdisciplinary translations.
In this Article, I will focus on the question of how legal frameworks
and approaches can distort social science-and, in particular, on how
these frameworks can misinterpret the significance of perceived inde-
terminacy in social science findings. While lawyers and legal scholars
may be willing to accept the idea that statutes and court decisions con-
tain indeterminacy, they tend to be less comfortable with indetermi-
nacy in social science. Rather than accepting that indeterminacy may
be an inextricable part of good science, judges and lawyers sometimes
confuse a lack of complete certainty with a lack of validity when at-
tempting to make use of social scientific research. I will argue that
there is a systematic lack of appreciation among lawyers and legal
scholars for the scientific valence and value of indeterminacy in social
science findings.
* John and Rylla Bosshard Professor, University of Wisconsin Law School; Senior Research
Faculty, American Bar Foundation; Affiliated Faculty, Department of Anthropology, University
of Wisconsin. I thank the editors at the DePaul Law Review for their care in working on this
special issue, the participants in this year's Clifford Symposium for their intellectually stimulat-
ing conversation, and in particular Professor Stephan Landsman for challenging us to think in
new ways about this interesting topic.
1. See, e.g., Anita Bernstein, Security, Freedom, Unpredictability, Predictability, 60 Di PAUL L.
REV. (2010); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Plaintiffs' Lawyers: Dealing with the Possible
but Not Certain, 60 DEPAut. L. REV. (2010).
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The field of anthropological linguistics provides a useful lens
through which to analyze the problem of translation between different
professions. In Part II, I outline this linguistic approach to studying
interdisciplinary translation.2 This part of the Article introduces a
number of tools for analyzing communication that have been devel-
oped by linguistic anthropology in recent decades. Part III uses those
tools to produce analyses of the somewhat different languages of law
and social science. 3 In Part IV, I consider the questions that arise
when we attempt to translate across these divergent professional lan-
guages.4 Part V focuses on particular questions of certainty and un-
certainty in this cross-disciplinary translation.5 The Article concludes
with a recommendation: anyone who wishes to achieve a high-quality
translation of social science into legal terms should pay close attention
to the assumptions and orientations embedded in linguistic
frameworks.
II. LINGUISTIC FRAMEWORKS
Anthropologists have for many years examined the issues involved
in translating between different cultures and languages. 6 In recent de-
2. See infra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 12-26 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 34-42 and accompanying text.
6. At its inception, anthropology in the United States was characterized by a "four-field" ap-
proach that combined the subfields of cultural (also called "sociocultural"), physical, linguistic,
and archeological anthropology. See FRANZ BoAs, A FRANZ BoAs RIEAIDR: THE SHAPING OF
AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY, 1883-1911, at 35 (George W. Stocking, Jr. ed., 1974) (describing
anthropology as combining biological, linguistic, ethnological-i.e., cultural-and archaeological
analysis). Cultural and linguistic anthropologists shared the task of translating across very differ-
ent cultures and languages, often working in non-Western settings. As Alessandro Duranti, a
leading linguistic anthropologist, explains,
Linguistic anthropology must be viewed as part of the wider field of anthropology ...
because it examines language through the lenses of anthropological concerns. These
concerns include the transmission and reproduction of culture, the relationship be-
tween cultural systems and different forms of social organization, and the role of the
material conditions of existence in a people's understanding of the world.
ALESSANDRO DURANTI, LINGUISTic ANTiHRopoitoGY 4 (1997). This set of concerns means that
linguistic anthropologists' research draws on advances in understanding societies and cultures
developed by its "cousin" within anthropology-sociocultural anthropology-as well as on tech-
nical approaches to analyzing languages that have emerged from other disciplines that study
language. See ELIZABETH MERTZ, TIHE LANGUAGE oF, LAw Scnool: LEARNING TO "THINK
LIKE A LAwYER" 16-21 (2007) [hereinafter MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAw Schooi].
As a result, linguistic anthropology can provide a powerful set of tools for understanding the
cultural and social dimensions of languages, and for analyzing what happens when we try to
translate between different cultures (or subcultures-including subcultures such as those existing
within different disciplines or professions):
Linguistic anthropologists start from the assumption that there are dimensions of
speaking that can only be captured by studying what people actually do with language,
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cades, the field has paid particular attention to the linguistic assump-
tions and frames that undergird communication of all kinds.
Whenever we speak, we are making assumptions about how language
works-for example, we may assume that raised voices indicate anger,
that interrupting someone else in a certain setting is a sign of friend-
ship (or not), that using a deferential form of speech is a marker of
respect or social distance, and so forth. It turns out that our assump-
tions about language and how it operates provide a crucial structure
for effective communication. Our assumptions about language itself
operate on a "metalinguistic" level, one step removed from the details
of what we actually say, but working at another linguistic level to
structure and guide how we talk.
To take one broad example, consider the impact of how we frame
any conversation with another person. If I think that we are having an
argument, I may interpret the same words quite differently than I
would if I think that we are having a friendly discussion. Think about
how one might attempt to redirect a conversation gone wrong by at-
tempting to provide a new frame: "I'm not disagreeing with you; I just
want to understand what you are saying." Such metalinguistic 7 cor-
by matching words, silences, and gestures with the context in which those signs are
produced. A consequence of this programmatic position has been the discovery of
many ways in which speaking is a social act and as such is subject to the constraints of
social action.
DuRANTI, supra, at 9. Thus, a linguistic anthropological approach examines how language is
actually used by members of different cultures and subcultures, looking at intricate aspects of
language structure, but also at the social and cultural settings in which that structure is put into
action. For other exegetical descriptions of linguistic anthropological concepts as they apply to
law, see MIERi-, THE LANGUAGE OF LAw Sciiooi, supra, at 16-21, 26-30; see generally Eliza-
beth Mertz, Legal Language: Pragmatics, Poetics, and Social Power, 23 ANN. REv. ANTHROPOL-
OGY 435 (1994).
7. Technically, this is actually a "metapragmatic" correction. See Michael Silverstein, Lan-
guage Structure and Linguistic Ideology, in TiHE ELEMENTS: A PARASESSION ON LINGUISTIC
UNrrs AND LEEvls 193, 208 (Paul R. Clyne, William F. Hanks & Carol L. Hofbauer eds., 1979);
Michael Silverstein, Metapragmatic Discourse and Metapragmatic Function, in RiFiLEXIVE LAN-
GUAGE: REPORTED SPEECH AND METAPRAGMATics 33 (John A. Lucy ed., 1993); see also
DURANTI, supra note 6, at 37-38.
The "pragmatic" level of language meaning relies on contexts of use; for example, the word
"this" cannot be interpreted without some knowledge of surrounding context. For a more de-
tailed explanation of the difference between "pragmatic," "semantic," and "syntactic/grammati-
cal" levels of language, see Elizabeth Mertz, An Afterword: Tapping the Promise of Relational
Contract Theory-"Real" Legal Language and a New Legal Realism, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 909,
920-22 (2000). "Metapragmatic" language, then, operates at a metalinguistic level to reflect on
this social or contextual function of language. So if I say, "I'm only trying to say nice things to
you," I am using metalanguage to try to correct how you are understanding the contextual aspect
of what I said (and thus, I am engaging in a "metapragmatic" correction). The study of
metapragmatics has grown within anthropological linguistics in recent decades and has yielded
some very important insights about communication and miscommunication in social settings.
See DURANTI, supra note 6, at 37-38; see generally Elizabeth Mertz & Jonathan Yovel, Metal-
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rections do not only affect a global interpretive frame for the interac-
tion, they can also alter interpretations of individual word meaning,
gestures, and facial expressions. (And conversely, our reading of
small nonverbal cues can contribute to our overall metalinguistic
framing assumptions.) These interpretations can shift from minute to
minute in any conversation, although we frequently also receive some
stabilizing signals from overall settings-particularly institutional set-
tings. For example, when a professor walks up to the front of the
classroom and begins to talk, an interpretive frame such as "this is
instructive speech" or "this is a lecture" is generally set in motion,
triggered by the speech situation-until or unless there is some other
strong-signal to the contrary. By contrast, were a friend to stand up
on a table at a party and utter the same words that this professor
spoke, they would likely not be interpreted in the same way because
of the difference in metalinguistic framing given in part by the setting.
Thus, the kind of language we use, the way it is structured, and the
setting we are in all interact to produce very particular kinds of under-
standings (and, at times, misunderstandings).
Notice that these frameworks also rely on theories about language
itself and how it functions. Anthropologists have denominated these
theories "linguistic ideologies" because they are not neutral ideas, but
are rather deeply implicated in the cultures and social structures in
which they are situated.8 For example, if you think that different
kinds of speech reflect people's status and concomitant worth or intel-
ligence, you may interpret speech that is typical of someone from a
lower socioeconomic class as indicative of a lower mental ability or
work ethic.9 This idea about language, or linguistic ideology, is
inguistic Awareness, in HANDBOOK OF PRAGMATICS: COGNITION & PRAGMATICS 1, 7-8
(Dominiek Sandra et al. eds., 2000); Elizabeth Mertz, Semiotic Anthropology, 36 ANN. REv.
ANTHROPOLOGY 337 (2007).
8. For general overviews of this development, see generally Kathryn A. Woolard & Bambi B.
Schieffelin, Language Ideology, 23 ANN. REv. ANTHROPOLOGY 55 (1994), and articles in LAN-
GUAGE IDEOLOGIES: PRAcriCE AND THEORY (Bambi B. Shieffelin, Kathryn A. Woolard & Paul
V. Kroskrity eds., 1998).
9. Judith Irvine, for example, describes how metalinguistic conceptions of the relationship be-
tween low- and high-ranking members of a society are then enacted through daily use of differ-
ent styles of language (known as "linguistic registers") in Wolof society:
[Tihe Wolof metapragmatic terminology firmly identifies the two registers, "noble
speech" and "griot speech," with the rank of speakers-nobles and griots being oppo-
sitely ranked castes....
Both registers are used on some occasions by almost everyone. Still, their use always
conveys a sense that the participants in a speech situation inhabit contrasting ranks,
even if only metaphorically.
Judith T. Irvine, Ideologies of Honorific Language, in LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES: PRACICE AND
THEORY, supra note 8, at 51, 57.
[Vol. 60:397400
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strongly shaped by the interplay of language and social hierarchy in a
given society. It can obviously affect how an individual is perceived
and heard in individual speech encounters and can in turn affect ac-
cess to educational or other social resources that themselves then af-
fect people's socioeconomic status.' 0 (This is not to say that there are
not other factors influencing these outcomes as well; it is simply to
map part of the contribution of language to these dynamics.)
To summarize, there is a great deal of research in anthropological
linguistics pointing to the importance of metalinguistic frames and ide-
ologies of language in everyday communication." This research gives
us new precision in analyzing how we communicate with each other,
particularly when we are attempting to communicate across social,
cultural, or institutional divisions, such as those between different dis-
ciplines and professions.
III. THE METALINGUISTICS OF LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
Let us now consider how overarching frameworks shaping the lan-
guages of law and of social science deal with conceptions of indetermi-
nacy.12 One of the primary functions of law in U.S. society, as in many
other societies, is to guide the resolution of conflicts-to reach deci-
sions or outcomes when a matter is in dispute. Often, given the costs
of going to court, these matters are of fairly large consequence to the
parties involved.' 3 The language of law, then, may be indeterminate
10. MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAw Scuoot, supra note 6, at 24-25.
11. In my experience, it is not uncommon for those outside of linguistics to experience frustra-
tion when they initially encounter concepts from this field. For the reader who finds the linguis-
tic terminology-especially in my footnotes-annoyingly technical, I have two consoling
comments. First, I assure you that I have simplified this considerably. Second, anyone outside
of legal academia who picks up an article on the more arcane aspects of any legal field would
likely have a similar reaction. Thus, one important metalinguistic step for all of us might be to
develop some patience-or perhaps just a thick skin-in trying to wade through explanations
from other fields. The payoff, we all hope, is that in learning from hard-working thinkers in
other fields, we can enrich our understandings in ways that will translate into better use of social
science and better-informed legal initiatives. (For those who wish that I myself had been more
adept at performing the translation process that I am describing, I am happy to accept with
humility the idea that I am as much an ongoing learner as an expert in this new endeavor-and
to invite us as a community to work together in developing new and better approaches.)
12. Of necessity, this discussion is at a schematic and abstract level, although it is also
grounded in specific discourses and institutions. I am, in a sense, employing a method made
famous many years ago by the famous sociologist Max Weber. Weber advocated the use of
"ideal types" in analyzing social phenomena; these abstract categories allowed analysts to com-
pare across specific contexts while still remaining close to empirically observed reality. See MAX
WEBER, THE MFTHODOi.OGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 90-91 (Edward A. Shils & Henry A.
Finch eds. & trans., 1949).
13. Stewart Macaulay has for many years been trying to call attention to the insight, long
noted and documented, within the law-and-society tradition, that "[I]aw is not free." Stewart
2011] 401
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in many ways, but ultimately it is used to reach decisions. In the
United States, the paradigmatic model for resolving these disputes is
an adversarial one in which two sides are pitted against one another,
with each side ideally making the strongest possible case for its posi-
tion. (In actuality, of course, the party with the most resources is fre-
quently the one able to launch the strongest case, regardless of the
merits in the abstract.) 14
This core model is clearly in evidence in the first year of law school,
when students are inducted into the new mode of "thinking (and talk-
ing) like lawyers." A study I conducted of first-year law school classes
demonstrated that adversarial dialogue is insistently modeled in this
formative pedagogical moment, regardless of the kind of school or
professorial teaching method. 15 A similar finding emerged from an
investigation conducted by the Carnegie Foundation.16 The authors of
the widely-cited Carnegie Report identify a "signature pedagogy"17 in
legal education centered on an oppositional "case-dialogue" 18
method: "[L]egal argument is often triggered by conflicts-events that
confuse or contradict a community's expectations. Legal proceedings,
especially litigation, therefore, have an inescapable narrative dimen-
Macaulay, Law and the Behavioral Sciences: Is There Any There There?, 6 LAw & PoL'Y 149, 152
(1984); see also Stewart Macaulay, The New Versus the Old Legal Realism: "Things Ain't What
They Used to Be," 2005 Wis. L. REv. 365, 383 (gently pointing out that although more than
twenty years had passed since the earlier publication-and others by similarly minded scholars-
the idea that using law has costs still seems to be news in some forms of legal scholarship).
14. For a famous article on this issue in the law-and-society tradition, see generally Marc Ga-
lanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw &
Soc'y Riev. 95 (1974). Inequalities in the delivery of legal services have been well-established
within sociological and anthropological studies of law, and yet legal professionals thinking about
doctrinal reform still at times reason as if all players have an even playing field. See Stewart
Macaulay, Contracts, New Legal Realism, and Improving the Navigation of The Yellow Subma-
rine, 80 Tut. L. Riv. 1161, 1167, 1172, 1191-92 (2006).
15. See MERTZ, THE LANGUAGE OF LAw Sciioo-, supra note 6, at 124-28,130-32. This study
found that professors used a variety of "surface structures" in their teaching-ranging from
question-answer dialogues that approximated prototypical Socratic dialogues to a class in which
the professor occupied much of the time in a monologic lecture style. Id. Yet even the professor
prone to monologue framed his own lectures in terms of question-answer dialogue. One profes-
sor included the following in his lecture:
Now, when you asked me if that is a subjective standard or not, the answer has to be,
"No, absolutely not," because reasonable is always objective.... I think, what you
were probably driving at is, is the more basic question, "Is this an individualistic deter-
mination on a case-by-case basis?" Absolutely, absolutely.
Id. at 166. A central argument in the book is that the deep structure of law school teaching often
reinforces a core focus on argumentative dialogue as the source of wisdom and legal legitimacy.
Id. at 4-5.
16. See WILLIAM M. SULLIVAN ET AL., EDUCATING LAWYERS: PREPARATION FOR THE PRO-
FESSION oF LAw 47-48 (2007).
17. Id. at 75.
18. Id. at 48.
[Vol. 60:397402
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sion, with story and counter-story being constructed by the contending
parties to the dispute."' 9 This results in a conflictual structure that
focuses students' attention on abstract argumentation rather than on
the practical realities and ethical dilemmas they will confront as prac-
ticing lawyers. 20
The point of linguistic exchanges in this system is to make a deci-
sion, and "maybe" or "let's think about it more" will not achieve this
result. As students are taught to inhabit the linguistic landscape 21 of
legal reasoning, they learn to hone in on carefully delimited points of
decision: was there a two-sided agreement in which both parties
agreed to the same terms? What sorts of things should we look at to
make this decision? What sorts of agreement "count"? Evidence in
this system is introduced for the purpose of making a decision one
way or the other. Indeterminacy as to law and facts may be unavoida-
ble, but the goal of legal work is to resolve that indeterminacy, using
versions of what happened (and understandings of how these versions
fit within a legal framework) that seem most plausible to the decision
maker.22
By contrast, the ideal in social science is to produce the most accu-
rate possible account or explanation of social phenomena. One im-
portant step in this process is to carefully chart out the limits of any
particular study because otherwise the researcher may wind up claim-
19. Id. at 75.
20. See id. at 186-88.
21. See id.
22. There are a number of ways of analyzing how this occurs. For example, psychologists have
examined how jurors draw on information gleaned from testimony and non-testimonial behavior
to construct the stories these jurors use to make decisions. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond et
al., Juror Questions During Trial: A Window into Juror Thinking, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1927,
1956-57 (2006) (explaining that when permitted to ask questions, jurors attempt to "cross-
check" information); Mary R. Rose & Shari Seidman Diamond, Offstage Behavior: Real Jurors'
Scrutiny of Non-Testimonial Conduct, 58 DEPAUL L. REV. 311, 340 (2009) (asserting that "off-
stage" behavior has little effect on group jury decision making). Earlier work on psychology and
language suggested that jurors use a "story model" to reach decisions. See W. LANCE BENNET
& MARITIA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCrlNG REALITY IN THE COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDG-
MENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE 3 (1981); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, Explaining the Evi-
dence: Tests of the Story Model for Juror Decision Making, 62 J. PERSONA ITY & Soc. PSYCHOL.
189, 205-06 (1992). More recent work has affirmed and further analyzed the use of stories or
narratives in jury deliberations. See generally Robin H. Conley & John M. Conley, Stories from
the Jury Room: How Jurors Use Narrative to Process Evidence, in STUDIES IN LAw, Porrics &
SoCIETY 25 (Austin Sarat ed., 2009).
From different angles, scholars have used data on the actual operation of trials to conclude
that the system works well in producing certain results from uncertain information. See generally
ROBERT P. BURNs, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL (2001); NElt VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANs, AMER-
ICAN JURIES: THE VERoIr (2007). On the role of linguistics in structuring how evidence is
presented, see J. MAXWELL ATKINSON & PAUL DREW, ORDER IN COURT: THE ORGANISATION
oF VERBAL INTERACIlON IN JUDICIAL SETrINGS 6-8 (1979).
2011] 403
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ing too much from her results. All social science methods are necessa-
rily partial; each provides only a particular angle on what is
happening. Thus, indeterminacy becomes not a barrier to success, but
part of the success: the successful social scientist demarcates what she
cannot explain as well as what she can explain. In this sense, social
scientists have a freedom to pursue accuracy at the expense of quick
certainty, a freedom that lawyers lack. The point of communicating
findings, whether in an article or at a professional meeting, is to push
forward the state of knowledge in a field rather than to reach a defini-
tive result. While researchers may attach normative recommenda-
tions to their results, reaching normative judgments is not a core part
of the metalinguistic framework behind most social science research.23
Because social scientists can take time to stand back and come to
more precise conclusions, they can also approach evidence differently.
In the best cases, they permit what they find "on the ground" to guide
their conclusions; they do not ignore important facts that might upset
their preconceptions. Lawyers, on the other hand, are trained to be
advocates. It is their job to discredit facts that might undermine their
clients' cases. Judges, legislators, and sometimes law professors, we
hope, can stand back a bit further. But they often come to the mate-
rial steeped in a legal framework that poses alternatives in unsubtle
terms-yes or no, guilty or not guilty. Their training and circum-
stances do not permit the luxury of standing back to survey the scene
for very long: people are waiting for their decisions, often in urgent
circumstances. Neither the legal professionals nor the people they
serve are particularly interested in a long-winded, heavily hedged, or
deeply nuanced explanation of what is happening. They must make
choices and come to decisions. From this perspective, the careful lan-
guage and lengthy conclusions of social science studies can appear to
be an extravagance-indeed, an abandonment of social responsibility.
As Lee Epstein and Gary King succinctly explain, "An attorney who
treats a client like a hypothesis would be disbarred; a Ph.D. who advo-
cates a hypothesis like a client would be ignored." 24
23. At least since the time of Thomas Kuhn, scholars studying science itself as a process have
noted that scientific evolution is not entirely divorced from social and normative frameworks.
See THOMAS S. KuHN, THE S-rUCrURE OF SCIENTIFic REVOLUTIONS 1-4 (2d ed. 1962); see
generally BRUNO LATOUR & S-TVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIr.: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUC-
TION OF SCIEN-iFIC FAcrs (1979). However, even given this inevitable connection with the peo-
ple and institutions from which they come, scientific and social scientific methodologies offer
some checks on the predispositions of researchers performing studies. For a classic statement
along these lines, see MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SocioLoGY 143-46 (H. H.
Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1946).
24. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. Cm1. L. REv. 1, 9 (2002).
[Vol. 60:397404
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An action-oriented framework is in many ways the backbone of le-
gal reasoning-it is, after all, the whole point of the legal system. On
the other hand, it can also create confusion about some crucial issues
and nuances that might be important to legal decision making. An
urgency about getting to the "bottom line," while it is a daily necessity
in law, can sometimes lead to the evolution of overly simplistic "rules
of thumb" that go unchecked or unquestioned. Social science and sci-
ence undergo a regular process of peer review before being published
in professional journals; during this process (when it works correctly),
any overgeneralizations or mistakes can be corrected.
Imagine, for example, that studies of some mammals showed that
animals who were aggressive during conflicts survived better than
those who were passive. These perfectly sound scientific studies might
lead to a generalization: "Aggressive behavior leads to better survival
outcomes." Now imagine an attempt to apply this finding in a legal
setting; imagine that someone tries to leap directly from science to law
without considering translation issues. In a legal setting, one would
typically want to use science to generate a rule to guide human behav-
ior, such as, "It works better to be aggressive when in an argument."
Numerous difficulties with this approach become apparent. Ideally,
peer review of a leap of this kind between "some mammals" and
humans would reveal the problems of generalizing so simplistically be-
tween normative fields (survival in biological versus legal/social/moral
terms), among kinds of mammals (humans versus others, minimally),
and across very different settings (all jokes about courtrooms as jun-
gles aside). To understand the situation for humans, peer reviewers
would want all of these translation issues to be squarely confronted;
they would expect any generalization about human conduct to be
founded in careful research on human behaviors in different contexts;
and they would require scholars writing on the topic to pay close at-
tention to research that had already been done in the area. The goal
would not necessarily be to generate any guideline for behavior; in-
stead it would be to create an ongoing, increasingly nuanced discus-
sion of how different sorts of behavior play out in different contexts
for different kinds of mammals. The only parallel check on such er-
rors in law would involve use of the adversarial process and would
often involve rival expert witnesses, a long and laborious process that
does not always reach accurate results. Peer review is not commonly
performed by law reviews, and individual attorneys are not required
2011] 405
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to undergo training that would help them catch these kinds of errors
on their own. 2 5
In areas such as family law, where complex social and psychological
realities meet the blunt edge of legal procedure, the legal system has
taken increasing note of the shortcomings of its own core approach to
social problems. For several decades, legal professionals have become
ever-more concerned about the unfortunate results for families and
children of unquestioning commitment to full-blown adversarial pro-
cedures. 26 However, as these legal professionals then turn to experts
in other fields such as psychology and social work (as well as to the
relevant empirical research), they move into new worlds-worlds for
which a standard legal education leaves them poorly equipped. Con-
versely, researchers in social science are frequently blissfully unaware
of the realities of the legal universe into which their findings may be
dropped. As a consequence, people on both sides of this ongoing con-
versation may proceed unaware that they are assuming a level of in-
terdisciplinary transparency that does not exist. They may, in fact, be
trying to have two very different conversations. At best, they leave
these exchanges with a smug sense of superiority, reflecting on how
stupid or silly the other disciplinary perspective was. At least in this
case they are aware that there is some kind of disciplinary difference.
At worst, they leave thinking that they have understood one another
perfectly, when in fact they selectively heard bits and pieces that they
found useful, fitting them into their own disciplinary frameworks. In
these cases, a failure to carefully reflect on the translation process it-
self yields misleading results, paired with a misguided sense of over-
confidence in the scientific validity of those results.
IV. TRANSLATING BETWEEN DISCIPLINARY FRAMEWORKS
In a recent essay, anthropological linguist Michael Silverstein pro-
poses a new framework for understanding translation-one that is
quite useful in analyzing attempts at interdisciplinary conversation.
He argues that we are in fact not dealing with true "translation" when
we move between law and social science, in the sense of simply pick-
ing up one word and translating into an exact equivalent in another
25. See Elizabeth Mertz, Translating Science into Family Law: An Overview, 56 DEPAuI. L.
Risv. 802-03 (2007) (noting an example of law review authors' generalization from studies of
mice to humans in the context of the legal system). Appellate courts' consideration of rival
amicus briefs suffers from many of the same defects: adversarial structure in which monied
interests may have an advantage, judges who are not trained social scientists, etc.
26. ELEANOR E. MACCO1Y & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING TIE CH ILD: SOCIAL & LEGAL
DILEMMAS OF Cus-oDy 7-10 (1992).
[Vol. 60:397406
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language. 27 Using an approach developed from empirical research on
languages, Silverstein demonstrates that it is unusual to find a straight-
forward equivalence between expressions in two different languages.
This kind of perfect equivalence is limited to relatively universal as-
pects of linguistic systems, anchored in grammatical structuring. One
example would be the use of a "first-person" form to indicate the
speaker of an utterance ("I," for example). Once we locate that form
in two languages, we can with some confidence claim to be performing
a relatively "pure" translation when we substitute one for the other.
(Even with these very straightforward categories, there are some in-
teresting variations among languages in the importance of distinctions
such as those between "I," "me," and "mine"-that is, differences in
grammatical "case.") But there are certain very limited kinds of
speech that lend themselves to being translated in the most transpar-
ent sense.2 It is therefore arguably possible to translate "I" into an-
other language and be sure that you mean the same thing in both
languages.
However, if we move beyond these straightforward and limited ex-
amples, we move into different, far more complicated territory. At
this point, Silverstein would argue that we are engaged in a different
task when we try to move between languages. He uses the issue of
expletives or swearing to make his point.29 For example, he points to
one of the most profane utterances possible in the Tonkawa language:
"May you give birth to a wandering ghost."30 If we just transparently
"translate" these words into English, we capture very little of the in-
tended meaning for an English speaker in the United States today.
Conversely, if we were to directly translate a common profanity from
English for a speaker of Tonkawa, she might find the resulting utter-
ance somewhat puzzling (as, for example, if one translated "fuck you"
as "you have sex"). Even within the realm of English-language speak-
ers, a speaker of U.S. English who was unacquainted with British
norms might wonder why British English-speakers get upset when the
word "bloody" is used; under a literal "translation," he might translate
"it was a bloody mess" as a description of an injury.
27. See Michael Silverstein, Translation, Transduction, Transformation: Skating "Glossando"
on Thin Semiotic Ice, in TRANSLATING CULTURES: PERSPECrIVES ON TRANSLATION AND AN.
THROPOLOGY 75, 75-76 (Paula G. Rubel & Abraham Rosman eds., 2003).
28. These are often located at an intersection of language structure and function ("speaker" as
in the person from whom, as indicated grammatically, this utterance functionally comes) and
social-contextual roles ("speaker" as the person in this social setting who is the author of the
utterance).




Taking the argument one step further, imagine now that you want
to translate a play or a story from Tonkawa into English. At one point
a character in the story swears at another. You might decide to render
"may you give birth to a wandering ghost" as "fuck you." Clearly,
something other than transparent translation has occurred here. Sil-
verstein calls this more complicated procedure "transduction":
We should think seriously of the underlying metaphor of the energy
transducer that I invoke, such as a hydroelectric generator. Here,
one form of organized energy [e.g. . . . downward . . . rush of water
against turbine blades] is asymmetrically converted into another
kind of energy at an energetic transduction site . . . harnessing at
least some of it across energetic frameworks. In this transducer, the
two modes of mechanical energy are converted in a functionally
regular way into another kind of energy altogether . . . of course
with some slippage between the two systems of energy organization,
due to "friction," "inefficiencies," "random contingent factors," and
other tragedies of the laws of thermodynamics and of uncertainty.31
To take an example familiar to students of many European languages,
consider the way pronouns are used to address other people (gener-
ally, the "second person"-in English, "you"). French speakers, for
example, distinguish between the second-person singular ("tu") and
the second-person plural ("vous"). However, French speakers also
use the second-person plural when speaking to just one person; in this
case, use of the plural pronoun indicates respect or formality. So I
might say "vous" to several people to indicate plural listeners-or I
might say "vous" to my boss, who is just one person, to indicate defer-
ence. How then would we transduce the meaning of a shift to "vous"
for a modern-day English speaker? If we retain the same word
("you"), we capture an important part of the literal meaning, but we
fail to convey another part of the communication. To accomplish this
in English, we may have to shift other aspects of the language-per-
haps changing from an informal to a formal tone in the sentence as a
whole-to "transduce" a core part of the meaning here.
There is still one more step to consider. In some cases-indeed per-
haps in most cases-we may have to make an even more dramatic
shift in moving between two languages; in fact, we may have to make
a "transformation." Silverstein states, "Sometimes there is no way
sufficiently to systematize and limit the transduction of verbal mate-
rial across functionally intersecting [linguistic] systems. Even trying to
play it as safe as we can with the textual stuff with which, by hypothe-
sis, we start, semiotic transformation then occurs." 32 Silverstein urges
31. Silverstein, supra note 27, at 83-84 (brackets in original).
32. Id. at 92.
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that we pay attention to the fact that some kind of transformation
might be entailed in almost every attempt to translate, although to
different degrees. Certainly, when we are translating between differ-
ent cultural contexts as well as different languages, he notes, we can
no longer speak of "translation" in the most transparent sense, be-
cause we have to shift so much of the literal meaning to achieve any-
thing resembling equivalence in the overall meaning. In fact, the
search for equivalence may in and of itself distort; when we try too
hard to create an equivalence, we may hide the fact that there are
things that we simply cannot translate. Thus, the appearance of equiv-
alence in our translation results in an even more imprecise sense of
the differences between the two systems for our listeners or readers.
James Boyd White, a pioneering scholar in the field of law and liter-
ature, makes a similar point when he writes "that all languages are
limited . . . that full translation from one to the other is always in a
deep sense impossible." 33 In this case, then, scholars from science and
the humanities wind up at the same conclusion-because in the lan-
guage of science, to ignore inexactitudes in translation is to miss the
boat in terms of scientific accuracy as well as in terms of interpretive
adequacy. Imagine that a scientific finding ("eating grass has benefi-
cial health consequences") has been presented with caveats, so that
the researchers tell you that their findings apply only to laboratory
rats and not humans and that much more testing will be required
before applicability to humans can be ascertained. Now suppose that
someone were then to attempt to "translate" this finding without the
caveat, saying that there is recent scientific research showing potential
benefits of eating grass and that we might all want to go out and try
this. Most of us would have no difficulty locating the translation prob-
lem here. But smaller, more subtle versions of this scenario are occur-
ring frequently when lawyers, judges, and law professors turn to social
science for answers.
In sum, any accurate or adequate attempt to move from social sci-
ence to law (or vice versa) requires systematic attention to the transla-
tion process itself. Analysis from diverse disciplinary points of view
teaches us that this translation process is far from transparent. The
important task ahead of us, then, is to develop better understandings
of legal and social scientific "transduction"-or translation in the
more complex sense. (I will not use the more complex terminology
here, on the theory that it might impede the "translation" that I am




attempting.) Only from that foundation can we calculate the trade-
offs involved in one approach as opposed to another. Given the cur-
rent content of legal education, there is reason to be concerned that
the average law student, lawyer, or social scientist has had little oppor-
tunity to consider these trade-offs.
One of the more subtle translation issues as we move between legal
and social scientific frameworks is the choice of how to approach the
indeterminacy valued by social scientists (as a guard against over-
claiming from limited study results) from the vantage of the law
(which cannot tell a litigant to wait five years until we clarify the state
of knowledge with more studies).
V. A CASE OF MISTAKEN INDETERMINACY (AND A DEMAND FOR
Too MucH DETERMINACY)
The need for determinacy in legal decision making-along with an
adversarial framework-may lead legal professionals to overinterpret
the indeterminacy they find in social science studies. One famous (or
infamous) example of this can be found in a Supreme Court decision
concerning the death penalty.
The Supreme Court's decisions in cases like McCleskey v. Kemp
and Lockhart v. McCree are often cited to illustrate the gap between
how the scientific and legal communities approach evidence from so-
cial science. 34 Lockhart, for example, raised the question of whether
the pre-screening of jurors to be sure that they would impose the
death penalty might result in juries that were more likely to convict a
defendant of a crime in the first phase of the trial.35 The Court was
presented with a number of social science studies; from varying meth-
odological angles, they all came to the same conclusion: when jurors
who might have difficulty imposing the death penalty are excluded
from a jury, the resulting juries are actually more likely to convict the
defendant.36 When confronted by this pile of studies, Justice Rehn-
quist used a method far more appropriate for law than for science: he
examined each one for any potential flaws and then disqualified all
but one.3 7 Left with this one study, he concluded that this by itself
34. See, e.g., David C. Baldus, Keynote Address: The Death Penalty Dialogue Between Law
and Social Science, 70 INo. L.J. 1033, 1038 (1995); Michael L. Radelet & Marian J. Borg, The
Changing Nature of Death Penalty Debates, 26 ANN. REv. Soc. 43, 48-49 (2000); Jonathan Si-
mon, Thinking About Criminal Justice: Sociolegal Expertise and the Modernization of American
Criminal Justice, in TiE: BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SoCIETY 320 (Austin Sarat ed.,
2004); see also McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
35. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
36. Id. at 169-73.
37. Id. at 168-74.
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was inadequate to document a bias toward conviction on the part of
"death qualified" juries.38 In other words, he approached the pile of
studies in much the way an attorney would approach a stack of evi-
dence that contradicted her position, looking for reasons to throw out
anything with imperfections. However, as we have already noted,
good science is imperfect, and the best science makes careful note of
its own imperfections or uncertainties. Yet this very feature, which
balanced out the uncertainties endemic to good science, was described
as a source of fatal uncertainty by a leading U.S. jurist. A pile of stud-
ies that reach similar conclusions despite differences in methods and
research design is about the closest thing to a certain result one can
reach in science. It is always possible to find, within a scientific soci-
ety, some expressions of doubt and uncertainty; those expressions of
doubt are themselves in need of expert translation rather than naive
appropriation by professionals from other fields.
Of course, it may be that Justice Rehnquist was in fact like an attor-
ney who has already chosen a side and was simply sifting the evidence
in a way designed to reach a preordained conclusion. This is a point
made by well-known psychologist of law Pheobe Ellsworth, in her
classic essay on this difficult translation issue. 39 In that article, she
reviewed the Supreme Court's use of social science in death penalty
cases, making a good case for the proposition that the Court was re-
jecting sound social science on largely ideological grounds.40 Even
granting Ellsworth's point about the Court's likely motivation, it is
still worth noting that in setting out its reasoning, the Court was
forced to deal with the social science evidence. And the resulting
written opinion demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of the
norms for assessing social science accepted within the scientific com-
munity. It is also worth remarking that the Court perceived no need
to question its underlying orientation in dealing with social science,
refusing to even consider or discuss this crucial translation issue. And
indeed, this fundamental issue is not part of any standard law school
curriculum or of legal discourse generally. Yet, as Ellsworth ably
demonstrates, the norms for judging studies in social science differ in
important ways from standard legal interpretive approaches. 41 If
courts are to be arbiters of social science findings, a very minimal re-
38. Id. at 173-74.
39. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Unpleasant Facts: The Supreme Court's Response to Empirical
Research on Capital Punishment, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: LEGAL AND SoCIAL
SCIENcF APPROACHES 177 (Kenneth C. Haas & James A. Inciardi eds., 1988).
40. See id. at 205-07.
41. See id.
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quirement would seem to be that they become better-informed about
the norms surrounding indeterminacy in social science-norms that
differ in important ways from their own.42
VI. CONCLUSION
The lack of systematic consideration of this question of translation
is in some sense astonishing given how much attention has been paid
to the issue of courts' role in interpreting science and social science. 43
A simple but important lesson from linguistic anthropology is to begin
with an accurate assessment of differing norms within the communi-
ties being translated into law. In this case, a crucial norm to consider
is the different value of indeterminacy.
42. Here is a place where the field of anthropology might have something to offer: it is argua-
bly the social science field that has placed the problem of this kind of translation at the core of its
disciplinary practice. Since its inception, sociocultural anthropology has been at work develop-
ing methods for putting aside one's own cultural assumptions (spoken of as "ethnocentrism") in
order to gain a more accurate understanding of the norms and assumptions of other cultures.
43. This is evident in cases like Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993),
Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), and others, as well as in voluminous com-
mentary on these issues. I have elsewhere written about the differing demands for specificity
and precision in social science and law:
Law reviews require a high degree of precision in the citation to authority. . . . On the
other hand, they usually cannot and do not check the validity of the texts being cited
themselves. . . . By contrast, peer-reviewed journals rely on authors to be accurate
about page numbers . . . . It is quite possible to put the wrong page number into a
footnote for a peer-reviewed journal and get away with it. On the other hand, if one
cites a faulty study, ideally the peer reviewers will notice this. If the article author has
relied in some crucial way on a study known to be unreliable, he or she will not be able
to keep the citation; indeed, either a "revise and resubmit" or a rejection will likely
result.
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